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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NOT-SO-PRIVILEGED
PRESS
I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment mandates freedom of the press,' but the extent of
that freedom has been the issue in scores of Supreme Court opinions.
Whether press freedom is above and beyond that provided the general
public by the first amendment has been a fertile question for debate.2 The
question is more than academic, however; its answer has determined, for
example, that reporters must be jailed for refusing to comply with sub-
poenas and that newsrooms can be searched for evidence of criminal activi-
ties.
This article will discuss three areas in which the Supreme Court has
recently dealt with this question in the face of claims by the press that the
first amendment affords the press privileges in excess of those enjoyed by
everyone else. The three asserted privileges are: (1) the press may refuse
to divulge confidential information or sources' identities to a court or grand
jury; (2) newsrooms are not generally subject to search warrants issued in
connection with criminal investigations; and (3) reporters should be given
special access to newsmakers and news events, most specifically to prisons
and prisoners.
Although these claims are based on the first amendment, only in refer-
ence to the first claim has the Court even arguably recognized any burden
on rights substantial enough to trigger its first amendment balancing anal-
ysis.3 In the other two areas, both represented by 1978 Court decisions, the
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Nimmer, Introduction - Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does
it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HAsTrINGs L. J. 639 (1975); Lange, The Speech and Press
Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77 (1975); Nimmer, Speech and Press: A Brief Reply, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 120 (1975).
3. First amendment rights are considered by the Supreme Court to be preferred or funda-
mental rights, and have been since Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). When such
fundamental rights are burdened by some government action, the Court increases the intens-
ity of judicial review and determines whether the state has a compelling or overriding interest
and if the particular action is necessary to promote those interests. The following is an
articulation of this scrutiny:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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Burger Court has avoided a case-by-case balancing of interests by flatly
rejecting the existence of a constitutional infringement.
II. DISCUSSION
Reporters' claims of privilege emerged against a backdrop of Supreme
Court decisions which had encouraged the notion that the press is afforded
extraordinary protection and that government must walk a narrow line
when it in any way regulates or inhibits the press. The Court had struck
down state laws imposing special taxes on newspapers,4 authorizing prior
restraint of newspapers considered defamatory or lewd,5 and had broad-
ened the press' immunities by making it impossible for public figures to
collect for defamation or libel in the absence of malice.6 But attempts by
reporters to translate these decisions into a doctrine of special privilege
have had little success, with the Burger Court consistently refusing to
place media members on a higher constitutional plane than the public.
A. Sources
Although reporters have for many years claimed the right to keep confi-
dential the identity of their news sources, it was not until 1958 that a
reporter cited the first amendment for support.7 The first case was Garland
v. Torre," a libel action in which actress-singer Judy Garland sought to
force a television columnist to disclose the name of a CBS official who was
quoted in her column as making derogatory remarks against Miss Garland.
The action was against CBS and the reporter had refused to reveal the
source while being deposed. The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Potter Stewart (now Justice Stewart), upheld the conviction for contempt.
His opinion recognized that forcing disclosure would abridge first amend-
ment rights,9 but since the information sought "went to the heart"'0 of Miss
4. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
5. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (unconstitutional prior restraint on publication).
6. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In a recent article, a commentator
said New York Times Co. v. Sullivan "established that representatives of the press, like
officials of the federal government, are substantially 'immune' to charges of *defamation
arising from reports which further 'the public's business.'" Lange, The Speech and Press
Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 77, 79-80 (1975).
7. The courts have consistently refused to recognize any common law privilege, nor have
they found one to exist under the fifth amendment. State statutes have been of only slight
assistance since many of the statutes are limited and the courts have shown a predilection
towards interpreting them narrowly. See Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branz-
burg: The Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 160, 165-76 (1976).
8. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
9. "As to the Constitutional issue, we accept at the outset the hypothesis that compulsory
disclosure of a journalists's confidential sources of information may entail an abridgment of
press freedom by imposing some limitation upon the availability of news." Id. at 548.
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Garland's case, the "fair administration of justice"" on balance was deter-
mined to outweigh the damage to the first amendment. The court did,
however, approve the notion of a qualified privilege and hinted that in
cases in which the disclosure would be of less relevance, the reporter would
succeed in claiming a privilege.'2 Several courts subsequently adopted
Garland's balancing approach' 3 although others refused to accept any
qualified privilege.'4
Garland v. Torre remained the leading case on the point until 1972, when
the Burger Court decided Branzburg v. Hayes.'- This case held that news-
men have no privilege to refuse to testify before grand juries, despite the
fact that such testimony might implicate confidential sources.'"
Branzburg, like Garland before it, ordered the reporters to testify, but
Justice White's majority opinion appeared to deny the existence of any
qualified or absolute privilege.' 7 The opinion however, is unclear because
Justice White added that under certain circumstances first amendment
interests could justify denying disclosure.
Finally, as we have earlier indicated, news gathering is not without its First
Amendment protections, and grand jury investigations if instituted or con-
ducted other than in good faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolu-
tion under the First Amendment. Official harrassment of the press under-
10. Id. at 550.
11. Id. at 549.
12. Judge Stewart emphasized that no wholesale disclosure of sources was being sought and
the information was of obvious relevance. Id. at 549-50.
13. See, e.g., Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that
the government must show its interest in obtaining the information is substantial, the infor-
mation sought is material, and that there is no less drastic alternative method of obtaining
the information); State v. Knops, 49 Wis.2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971) (recognizing the
balancing test but weighing in favor of disclosure); In re Goodfader, 45 Haw. 317, 367 P.2d
472 (1961) (forcing the reporter, as a non-party deponent in a civil action, to disclose his
source while paying lip service to a balancing test).
14. See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1968) (rejecting any constitu-
tional privilege and ordering the reporter to disclose information to a grand jury); In re Taylor,
412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963) (rejecting any constitutional claims but barring disclosure on
statutory grounds).
15. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
16. Branzburg involved four cases, all of which presented the issue of whether reporters had
to appear and testify before grand juries and whether reporters could withhold confidential
information from grand juries. The four cases, consolidated by the Supreme Court, were
Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d
748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971); Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970); and In re
Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971).
17. Such a privilege would require judicial balancing, and Justice White wrote that the
Court was "unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey to such an
uncertain destination." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703 (1972).
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taken not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's relation-
ship with his news sources would have no justification. 8
The Court did not accompany this generalized language with any spe-
cific guidelines. Also, Justice Powell's pivotal concurring opinion,9 created
more confusion by arguably recognizing the existence of a qualified privi-
lege.
Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to give information bearing only a
remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, if he has
some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source
relationships without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have
access to the court on a motion to quash and an appropriate order may be
entered. The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation
of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to ciminal conduct.m
Since Branzburg, all but a few courts faced with the issue of whether to
order a reporter to testify and reveal either confidential information or
sources have cited Justice Powell's opinion to justify applying a case-by-
case balancing analysis. The Supreme Court's failure to provide concrete
guidelines has resulted in the application of differing tests which defy neat
categorizing, although some general observations are possible.
Those courts that have interpreted Branzburg to recognize a qualified
newsman's privilege have often applied some or all of a three-pronged test:
(1) whether probable cause exists to believe the reporter has relevant infor-
mation; (2) whether alternative sources are available; and (3) if a compel-
ling or important interest exists in ordering the testimony.
2
'
In criminal cases, which have involved both grand jury and, trial sub-
poenas, reporters' interests have usually been outweighed by the states'
interest in obtaining the information. 22 These courts generally have held
18. Id. at 707-08.
19. The Court's opinion represented the views of only Justices White, Rehnquist, and
Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger. Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dis-
sented. Justice Powell provided the key vote for the majority.
20. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972).
21. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26
HASTINGS L. J. 709 (1975).
22. See, e.g., Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976)
(recognizing a limited privilege but affirming a contempt conviction for refusing to disclose
a source of information); In re Tierney, 328 So.2d 40 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976) (ordering a reporter
to reveal the source of a grand jury leak); Rosato v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124
Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) (holding that sixth amendment right
to fair trial outweighed any possible infringement of first amendment rights); Fischer v. Dan,
41 App. Div.2d 687, 342 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1973) (permitting a reporter to keep the identity of a
source confidential, but ordering testimony regarding events observed by the reporter includ-
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that the states' interest in investigating and prosecuting crime is more
important than any qualified privilege.? Some courts have denied the
existence of any privilege, and thus refused to balance.24 A recent example
of this is the New Jersey Supreme Court, which in its decision dealing with
New York Times reporter Myron Farber,2 interpreted Branzburg as deny-
ing any privilege, qualified or otherwise.2 1 Moreover, the state court refused
to apply a strong state shield law,2 and held that the shield law is subordi-
nated by a defendant's sixth amendment right to have compulsory process
for his defense.?
Not all courts have ordered reporters to yield their sources in criminal
and grand jury cases. If it is apparent that the information sought is not
relevant and there has been no showing that alternative sources have been
ing the identities of those people the reporter observed); In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460,
295 A.2d 3 (1972) (rejecting any balancing tests and ordering testimony before the grand jury).
23. In light of the preeminent importance of the fair trial guarantee to criminal
defendants... which is certainly entitled to equal, if not greater, protection than
criminal investigations by grand juries, it seems to us that the right to require such
testimony in an investigation [of who leaked inadmissable evidence to a reporter]...
which goes to the right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial is irrefutable.
Rosato v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 213, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 444 (1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976).
24. See In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972); In re Farber, [1978] 4 MED.
L. R m. (BNA) 1360 (N.J. Sept. 21, 1978).
25. In re Farber, [1978] 4 ME. L. Rirm. (BNA) 1360 (N.J. Sept. 21, 1978).
26. The important and conclusive point is that five members of the [Supremel
Court have all reached the conclusion that the First Amendment affords no privilege
to a newsman to refuse to appear before a grand jury and testify as to relevant informa-
tion he possesses, even though in so doing he may divulge confidential sources....
Thus we do no weighing or balancing of societal interests in reaching our determina-
tion that the First Amendment does not afford appellants the privilege they claim. The
weighing and balancing has been done by a higher court.
Id. at 11.
27. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-21 (Supp. 1978-79) reads in part:
[A] person engaged on, engaged in, connected with, or employed by news media for
the purpose of gathering procuring, transmitting, compiling, editing or disseminating
news for the general public or on whose behalf news is so gathered ... has a privilege
to refuse to disclose, in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or before any investigative
body, including, but not limited to, any court, grand jury, petit jury...
a. The source, author, means, agency or person from or through whom any informa-
tion was procured, obtained, supplied, furnished, gathered, transmitted, compiled,
edited, disseminated, or delivered; and
b. Any news or information obtained in the course of pursuing his professional
activities whether or not it is disseminated.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI reads: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right. . .to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." N.J.
CONST. art. 1, 10 contains a similar provision.
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investigated, a privilege has been upheld. 9 In one case, even the tradition
of secrecy of the grand jury was found not to be enough to outweigh first
amendment interests.3 0
In civil cases, the scales apparently more easily tip in favor of the jour-
nalist, especially if the reporter is not a party to the action, there are other
available sources, or the information sought is not sufficiently material.3 '
But, reporters have been ordered to disclose sources or information when
it was clearly relevant and material. 32 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachussetts even refused to balance interests at all, declaring flatly
that no privilege of any kind exists for reporters in either criminal or civil
cases .33
As in any area of the law where a balancing of interests approach is
adopted, the resulting lack of uniformity creates uncertainty in the law. It
is difficult - as the cited decisions demonstrate - for a reporter to deter-
mine what his substantive rights are when called upon to reveal a source,
until an interlocutory appeal has run its course. Often the reporter must
spend at least some of this time in jail for contempt.Y Furthermore, such
proceedings delay the trial of a defendant or the investigation of a grand
jury. It has been speculated that Justice Powell's balancing approach in
Branzburg may have been prompted by a desire for more case law on the
subject before the Supreme Court provided more helpful guidelines.:
29. See, e.g., Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis.2d 601, 266 N.W.2d 279 (1978); State v. St. Peter,
132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974); Brown v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case
For a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 160, 178 (1976).
30. Morgan v. State, 337 So.2d 951 (Fla. 1976).
31. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973) (where the party seeking the information had not demonstrated adequate relev-
ance); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973)
(where other sources were available and the information did not go to the heart of the case);
Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (where no compelling interest was
shown to justify disclosure); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C.
1973)(quashing subpoenas issued to newspapers in a civil case which grew out of the Water-
gate burglary).
32. See, e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.) cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938
(1974)(libel action which would probably fail without the information Fought); Forest Hills
Util. Co. v. City of Heath, 66 Ohio Op.2d 66, 302 N.E.2d 593 (1973)(reporter ordered to
comply with a subpoena duces tecum).
33. "We intend no implication by what we have just said that, in some future case, it would
be within the trial judge's 'discretion' to determine that a qualified newsman's privilege
exists. . . We have this day reaffirmed that no such privilege exists." Dow Jones Co. v.
Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847, 850 (1973).
34. Since Branzburg at least 15 reporters have spent some time in jail for refusing to
disclose confidential information or the identity of a confidential source, according to statis-
tics provided by The Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press.
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There is more case law now, but many decisions are in direct conflict.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions concerning a newsman's testimonial
privilege should provide more instructive guidelines. However, in light of
the recent Burger Court's decisions on newsman's privilege claims in other
areas to be discussed, a new case regarding confidential sources might very
well put an end to any qualified privileges reporters in some states now
enjoy.
B. Searches
The Court's vagueness in Branzburg left room for reporters to argue for
a qualified privilege to withhold confidential sources and information.
There is far less room for debate on the question of whether the first
amendment protects journalists from newsroom searches. The argument in
favor of the protection is much the same: searches of newsrooms for crimi-
nal evidence run the risk of disclosing confidential information and
sources, thereby drying up such sources and abridging press freedom. If a
search warrant is issued the risk is far greater; there is no hearing on a
motion to quash the warrant before the search has been conducted and a
search warrant may disclose confidential information unconnected with
the object of the search.
The Supreme Court, however, has rejected these arguments. In Zurcher
v. Stanford Daily6 the Court insisted that the first amendment affords no
additional protection to reporters beyond the safeguards provided gener-
ally by the fourth amendment." The language of the Court's opinion is
clear: "Properly administered, the preconditions for a warrant - probable
cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things
to be seized, and overall reasonableness - should afford sufficient protec-
tion against the harms that are assertedly threatened by warrants for
searching newspaper offices.' ' s
1. Background
When the framers of the United States Constitution drafted the fourth
amendment, it was based upon the historical perspective of struggle be-
35. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26
HASTNGS L. J. 709, 717 (1975).
36. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
38. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978).
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tween the English monarch's bureaucracy and the press. 9 The amendment
itself has been subject to various interpretations, its recent history indicat-
ing a narrow reading."
Despite the many cases interpreting the first amendment, a federal dis-
trict court was faced with a scarcity of precedent to rezsolve the issues
presented by Zurcher. A brief recital of the facts is thus warranted. After
a clash between demonstrators and police in which nine officers were in-
jured, The Stanford Daily published a special edition chronicling the fight,
including photographs. Since police photographers had failed to take any
useful pictures, a search warrant was obtained in an attempt to locate
other photographs or negatives which might help identify the demonstra-
tors who attacked the officers. The search took place but. no further evi-
dence was found.4' The newspaper sought declaratory and injunctive relief
in a federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the search had deprived
the paper of first, fourth, and fourteenth amendment righits under color of
state law.42
The major issues the district court faced concerned the rights of third
parties against whom warrants are issued in criminal investigations, but
who are not suspected of criminal activity, 4 and whether -the first amend-
ment provides the press with any special protection against searches. The
39. See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724-9 (1961); Yackl, The Burger Court
and the Fourth Amendment, 26 KAN. L. REv. 335, 337-44 (1978).
40. Although there is neither the time nor space to cite exhaustive authority on this point,
a few examples should be cited. In Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), the Court
held that there existed no fourth amendment right to privacy in private papers turned over
to an accountant. And United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), held that a suspect had
given up any expectation of privacy when standing in the doorway to her house. For an
exhaustive account of the retreat of fourth amendment rights, see Yackl,, The Burger Court
and the Fourth Amendment, 26 KAN. L. REV. 335 (1978). He writes, "I believe that the Burger
Court is well advanced on a campaign to curtail the protections for individual liberty offered
by the provisions of the Constitution pertaining to search and seizure. Id. at 336.
41. 436 U.S. 547, 551-52 (1978).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. . .shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
43. The Stanford Daily apparently cited only four cases which dealt with searches of third
parties and three of those cases dealt with warrantless searches of third parties. The fourth
dealt with an arrest warrant for a material witness. The district court judge speculated that
the scarcity of cases was due to the fact that a subpoena duces tacum is the normal device
for obtaining evidence from an unsuspected third party. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F.
Supp. 124, 127-29 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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district court granted declaratory relief,4" holding that a magistrate could
issue a warrant to conduct a third party search only if there was probable
cause to believe a subpoena duces tecum was impractical."i Furthermore,
holding the first amendment modifies the fourth, the court added two more
conditions that must be met before a warrant to search a newspaper could
be issued. There must be a clear showing that 1) important materials
would be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction, and 2) a restraining
order would be ineffective.46 The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 7
2. The Supreme Court's Opinion
In reversing, Justice White's opinion for the Supreme Court labelled the
lower courts' rulings a "sweeping revision of the Fourth Amendment,"4
and held that there is no constitutional reason why innocent third parties
should not be subject to search warrants. Moreover, warrants are issued
to search property and not people, and as long as the property or evidence
seized is sufficiently described, there need be no special precautions
taken. 9
Taking a liberal view of the Constitution, Justice White concluded that
since the Constitution does not explicitly provide the press with any privi-
lege in regard to searches, there are none.
[The framers of the Constitution]... did not forbid warrants where the
press was involved, did not require special showings that subpoenas would
be impractical, and did not insist that the owner of the place to be searched,
if connected with the press, must be shown to be implicated in the offense
being investigated.0
44. Id.
45. Id. at 132.
46. Id. at 135. Almost all of the cases which support this modifying theory have dealt with
seizures of obscene material. For instance, in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205
(1964), the Court held that search and seizure of allegedly obscene books without a prior
hearing was unconstitutional. And in Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961), the
Court held that a state is not without restrictions in seizing materials, since some could
possibly be determined to be not obscene. For a general discussion of this modifying concept,
see Comment, Search Warrants and Journalists' Confidential Information, 25 AM. UNIv. L.
Rav. 938, 954-6 (1976).
47. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
48. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 554 (1978).
49. "The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is
suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific 'things' to
be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought." Id. at 556.
50. Id. at 1981-2. Justice White did note, however, that the requirements for a search
warrant should be applied with "particular exactitude when First Amendment interests
would be endangered by the search." Id.
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The Court also was unconvinced that there would be any "chilling effect"
on the dissemination of news. "' Furthermore, since there were very few
recorded incidents of search warrants against press facilities, there had
been no apparent abuse, but "if abuse occurs, there will be time enough
to deal with it." 2
The danger in the Court's decision is that it leaves room for, and encour-
ages, an increase in such incidents.5 3 Prosecutors and police would no
doubt prefer to search a newspaper than issue subpoenas duces tecum,
since search warrants may not be quashed before the search - exactly the
reason the press prefers subpoenas duces tecum. A search warrant is an
immediate weapon and usually by the time the occupanL of the property
can seek relief from the courts, the search is complete." If police have
uncovered confidential sources or information, the damage is done. Since
reporters have shown a preference for jail rather than compliance with
subpoenas,55 an official seeking documents for an investigation will have
substantially more success with a search warrant. 6
Zurcher has already had at least two reactions, one judicial and one
legislative. The judicial reaction came in the District of Columbia Circuit
51. Nor are we convinced, any more than we were in Branzburg v. Hayes... that
confidential sources will disappear and that the press will suppress news because of
fears of warranted searches. Whatever incremental effect there may be in this regard
if search warrants, as well as subpoenas, are permissible in proper circumstances, it
does not make a constitutional difference in our judgment.
Id. at 566 (citations omitted).
52. Id.
53. Since The Stanford Daily was searched in 1971, more than a dozen searches of news
organizations have been conducted, mostly in California, and mostly in rference to investiga-
tions involving the Symbionese Liberation Army. HOUSE COMM. ON Gov'T. OPERATIONS,
SEARCH WARRANTS AND THE EFFECTS OF THE STANFORD DAILY DECISION, H.R. REP. No. 95-1521,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as HousE REPORT].
54. I say "usually" the search is complete because it is possible to convince the police to
delay the search until an emergency motion can be made to the court. This was the case when
a warrant was presented at the Associated Press office in Helena, Mort. on April 10, 1978.
The police delayed and lawyers for the Associated Press succeeded in getting an order to delay
the search. The next day the warrant was quashed in court. Id. at 4-5.
55. See footnote 34 supra.
56. Justice Stewart addressed this point directly in his dissent in which the Court held that
a prior adversary judicial hearing is called for to determine the extent of any first amendment
infringement. He also disputed the Court's premise that the press should not receive a special
protection against this type of search.
Perhaps as a matter of abstract policy a newspaper office should receive no more
protection from unannounced police searches than, say, the office of a doctor or the
office of a bank. But we are here to uphold a Constitution. And our Constitution does
not explicitly protect the practice of medicine, or the business of banking from all
abridgement by government. It does explicitly protect the freedom of the press.
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1984-87 (1978)(Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Court of Appeals decision which upheld the power of investigators to sub-
poena the long distance telephone records of reports without informing the
reporters in advance.57 These toll records provide the date a call was made
and to what telephone number. Using such information, an investigator
can discover links between two people, criminal in nature or otherwise,
and, reporters claim, can uncover the identity of confidential sources, thus
discouraging their use. Citing Branzburg and Zurcher, the majority held
that before any judicial restraint will be placed on investigators desiring
such subpoenas, each reporter desiring protection will have to make an
individual showing that, through past abuse, the reporter personally faces
an imminent threat of irreparable harm and that his remedy at law is
inadequate. "8 In short, there is no first amendment privilege provided by
the press clause to maintain the secrecy of sources in a good faith criminal
investigation. 9
The majority also dismissed the reporter's fourth amendment claims,
reasoning that the toll records were business records of a third party and
the reporters had no reasonable expectation of privacy. 0 Chief Judge Skel-
ley Wright dissented, on the ground that there was prior judicial screening
before the reporter testified in Branzburg, and before the warrant was
issued in Zurcher1'
The legislative reaction to Zurcher was in the form of a recommendation
from the House of Representatives' Committee on Government Opera-
tions, urging legislation designed to curtail the effects of the case."2 The
57. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. A.T.&T., [1978] 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA)
1177 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 1978).
58. Id. at 1202.
59. Id. at 1189. The majority makes a distinction between good and bad faith investiga-
tions. Only if bad faith on the part of the government is shown will the reporter be eligible
for judicial screening of such warrants. Id. at 1199.
60. Id. at 1186. The majority cited United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding
that a bank depositor has no reasonable expectation of privacy of bank records held by the
bank); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (holding that the use of a government
informant is not a violation of fourth amendment rights); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S.
206 (1966) (holding that the fourth amendment is not violated when an undercover agent
misrepresents his identity and is invited to the defendant's home where an unlawful drug sale
is transacted).
61. Both [Branzburg and Zurcher], however, far from holding that the First Amend-
ment rights involved were deserving of no procedural protections, turned explicitly on
the determination that the prior judicial scrutiny on a case-by-case basis which was
afforded was sufficient to protect the First Amendment rights at stake. In the instant
case, however, no form of judicial scrutiny at all is provided. [emphasis of Chief Judge
Wright].
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. A.T.&T., [1978] 4 MED. L. RPR. (BNA) 1177,
1214 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 1978) (dissenting opinion).
62. HOUSE REPORT, supra, at 9.
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committee report concluded that Zurcher "infringes on news organiza-
tions' first amendment rights, could subject news offices to harrassment
by law enforcers, and could threaten the confidentiality of news sources.
' '0
While approving a Justice Department policy of restraint in regard to
issuing subpoenas to newsmen"4 and the Department's stated goal of deter-
mining whether a similar policy regarding search warrants is necessary,"
the committee recommended congressional legislation which would protect
third parties unsuspected of criminal activity unless itwere to be reasona-
bly shown that the evidence might be lost. This protection would extend
to all persons, not just the press. The committee expessed a desire that
such a law apply to the states."8
The two reactions are at odds. In light of the Supreme Court's fairly clear
attitude on searches and seizures and the rights of the press, the legislative
reaction obviously is the more promising for reporters who fear interference
with their newsgathering freedom.
C. Access
The Supreme Court's recent cases involving press claims of a right of
access to prisons and prisoners do not directly deal with the problem of
disclosing confidential sources and information, but they do specifically
address the question of whether special press privileges exist under the first
amendment. As it did in Zurcher, the Court has decided no special privi-
lege exists. 7
Before 1974, various lower courts were in conflict on whether prison
regulations forbidding personal interviews with specific inmates must yield
to reporters' claims that such regulations inhibited the free flow of vital
information about prisons, contrary to the mandate of the first amend-
ment.18 To reach their decisions, the courts applied different tests to deter-
63. Id. at 2.
64. The Justice Department's policy requires that before serving subpoenas on newsmen,
the material sought should be determined essential to an investigation, that alternative
sources be tried first, that negotiations with the press be conducted in advance, and that the
Attorney General personally approve the issuance of the subpoena. 28 C.F.R. §50.10 (1977).
65. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 53, at 6.
66. Id. at 10.
67. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2588 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417
U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
68. See, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. Kleindeinst, 494 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.), rev Vd sub nom,
Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (holding that the "right of access by the press
to newsworthy events is necessarily antecedent to its First Amendment right to publish." Id.
at 99. The Court said in an absolute ban on prisoner interviews violated the press's rights
and ordered the federal prison authorities to make case-by-case decisions on the importance
of the interviews sought.); McMillan v. Carlson, 493 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1974) (per curium)
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mine the constitutional questions. 9 Most courts agreed that the cases pre-
sented a first amendment issue.
The Supreme Court disagreed, however, holding in the companion cases
of Pell v. Procunier" and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.7 ' that there was
no first amendment right of access beyond that given the general public.
The Court thereby avoided the traditional first amendment case-by-case
analysis.
Pell and Saxbe involved press challenges to state and federal prison
policies forbidding interviews with individual inmates, but allowing inter-
views with randomly selected prisoners encountered while on general tours
of the facilities.72 Reporters claimed that only face-to-face interviews with
selected individual prisoners provided the candid give-and-take required
for accurate, factual stories on prison conditions.73 Justice Stewart's opin-
ion for the Court in both cases emphasized that the prison policies did not
completely forbid communication between reporters and selected prisoners
because written correspondence was permitted. His opinion also empha-
sized that at any given time a large percentage of recently released inmates
were available to be interviewed about prison conditions. 7' Relying on past
rulings that the first amendment right to gather news75 does not provide
(The prison policy was ordered to yield to an established author seeking an interview for a
book about James Earl Ray, the convicted murderer of Dr. Martin Luther King. The order
of the court was set aside after the Supreme Court handed down Pell and Saxbe.); Seattle-
Tacoma Newspaper Guild, Local 82 v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1973) (interview bans
upheld); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Bork, 370 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Mass. 1974) (holding the policy
invalid); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Kleindeinst, 364 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Tex. 1973)
(holding the government had not demonstrated a compelling state interest in its policy).
69. For example, in ordering the prisons to alter the interview ban, the court in Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Kleindeinst, 364 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Tex. 1973), said the govern-
ment was required to demonstrate a compelling interest. But, in upholding the interview ban
involved in Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild, Local 82 v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir.
1973), the court held the government only to a standard of reasonableness. For a general
discussion of these pre-Pell and Saxbe cases see 60 CoRNEsa L. REv. 446, 462 (1975).
70. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
71. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
72. Prison authorities object to interviews with specific inmates because they claim it
increases disciplinary problems in the prisons by making some inmates "public figures" with
a disruptive influence on the rest of the prison population. Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417
U.S. 843, 848-9 (1974).
73. [T]he media plaintiffs assert that, despite the substantial access to California
prisons and their inmates accorded representatives of the press - access broader than
is accorded members of the public generally - face-to-face interviews with specifically
designated inmates is such an effective and superior method of newsgathering that its
curtailment amounts to unconstitutional state interference with a free press.
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974).
74. Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843, 848 (1974).
75. "Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protec-
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the press with unrestrained access to all newsmaking events,'7 Justice
Stewart wrote that no first amendment interests were abridged by the
prison interview policies: "The First and Fourteenth Amendments bar
government from interfering in any way with a free press. The Constitution
does not, however, require government to accord the press special access
to information not shared by members of the public generally."7 7 Since no
first amendment infringements were involved, there was no need for the
Court "to engage in any delicate balancing.
'7
The message appeared clear: although news gathering was protected, the
government was in no way obligated to lend a helping hand to the press
in that gathering process.7 1 Some courts applied the rule in subsequent
cases,"' but the ninth circuit went against this trend. It affirmed a district
judge's preliminary injunction forbidding the Alameda County, California
sheriff from enforcing his strict bar on interviews and his rule forbidding
any access to one section of the jail previously off-limits to all members of
the public.8' That particular section of the jail had been labelled "cruel and
unusual punishment for man or beast as a matter of law," ' had been the
scene of a reported suicide, and, according to one psychiatrist, was respon-
sible for his patients' illnesses." The injunction required that the media
be given access to the jail and the off-limits sections, and that the sheriff
allow reporters to use photographic and sound equipmen t." The order did
not instruct the sheriff to allow access to the general public.
The ninth circuit acknowledged the holdings in Pell and Saxbe that "the
tion; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscer-
ated." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
76. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
77. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974).
78. Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843, 849 (1974).
79. It is interesting to note that Justice Stewart wrote the Court's opinion in both Pell and
Saxbe. He has been outspoken in his belief that the press enjoys a constitutionally protected
position, but that the only way to protect its freedom is for government to maintain absolute
neutrality towards the press. Justice Stewart wrote: "The public's interest in knowing about
its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect.
The Constitution itself is neither Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act. The
Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its resolution." Stewart, Or of the
Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975) (excerpted from an address given on Nov. 2, 1974, at
the Yale Law School).
Justice Stewart's neutrality theory is examined at length in Bezanson, The New Free Press
Guarantee, 63 VA. L. Rav. 731, 752-54 (1977).
80. See, e.g., Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977); Mazzetti v. United States,
518 F.2d 781 (10th Cir. 1975).
81. KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976).
82. Brennan v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 133 (N.D.Cal. 1972).
83. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2588, 2591 (1978).
84. KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284, 285 (9th Cir. 1976).
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news media's constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates is
co-extensive with the public's right." 5 But the court held that the sheriff's
restrictive policy constituted a violation of both the public and the media's
rights, and, applying a traditional first amendment balancing test, deter-
mined that the governmental policy did not further "an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest" and was not the "least drastic" means of
protecting that interest. 6 The court further held that while the press and
the public shared the same constitutional rights, those rights could be
accomodated in different ways, thus justifying the order permitting cam-
eras and sound equipment. 7
In an opinion which both strengthens and expands its previous state-
ments in Pell and Saxbe, the Supreme Court reversed the ninth circuit in
Houchins v. KQED, Inc."' Chief Justice Burger announced the Court's
decision which rejected the assertion that either the public or the press has
any right to information within the control of government: "This Court has
never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all
sources of information within government control."8 Because the Court
determined that the general public enjoyed no such right, the case fell
squarely within the holdings of Pell and Saxbe. The Chief Justice wrote:
"Under our holdings in Pell v. Procunier . . . and Saxbe v. Washington
Post. . . until the political branches decree otherwise, as they are free to
do, the media has no right, special of access [sic] to the Alameda County
jail different from or grbater than that accorded the public generally."0
Houchins, more strongly than either Pell or Saxbe, rejects the press'
assumption that the Constitution recognizes its role as a specially pro-
tected investigative arm of the public.8 This strict adherence to the doc-
trine of press and public being on the same constitutional footing - afford-
85. Id. at 285-6.
86. Id. at 286.
87. Id.
88. 98 S. Ct. 2588 (1978).
89. Id. at 2594.
90. Id. at 2597.
91. Unarticulated but implicit in the assertion that media access to the jail is essential
for informed public debate on jail conditions is the assumption that media personnel
are the best qualified persons for the task of discovering malfeasance in public institu-
tions. But that assumption finds no support in the decisions of this Court or the First
Amendment.
Id. at 2596. In the passage immediately preceding the passage quoted, the Chief Justice wrote:
[T]he choice as to the most effective and appropriate method [of dissemination of
information] is a policy decision to be resolved by legislative decision. We must not
confuse what is "good," "desirable" or "expedient" with what is constitutionally com-
manded by the First Amendment. To do so is to trivialize constitutional adjudication.
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ing each identical treatment, no matter whether one group has special
needs - might have far-reaching effects in areas where the press has
traditionally been given special treatment.9"
In his key concurrence, Justice Stewart9" rejected this literal interpreta-
tion of the Pell and Saxbe doctrine. He wrote: "[T]erms of access that
are reasonably imposed on individual members of the public may, if they
impede effective reporting without sufficient justification, be unreasonable
as applied to journalists who are there to convey to the general public that
the visitors see. ' 94
Dissenting, Justice Stevens stated that because in Houchins the policy
involved was so restrictive, the Court was placing its imprimatur on a
prison system which treated the public and the press alike by equally
violating the rights of both." He emphasized that the privilege claimed by
the press is one that is not claimed for individuals but for an institution
which exists to inform the public. This idea of the public's enjoyment of
certain press privileges vicariously has appeared before in isolated opin-
ions. " But, in Houchins, the Court has rejected it.
II. CONCLUSION
The objective of this article was to demonstrate the relative lack of
success reporters have had with the Burger Court when claiming special
first amendment constitutional privileges. Because of the dynamic nature
of first amendment law, any article can only present the current state of
the law. It could change tommorrow.97
92. For instance, reporters enjoy a wide range of privileges, most of which have evolved by
tradition and not legislation. Reporters are often provided with special tables or work rooms
by governmental agencies - local, state and federal. It is unclear whether the Court would
rule all of these unconstitutional if challenged by members of the public. The Court has,
though, indicated that such privileges would be permissable if either passed legislatively or
decreed executively. Id. at 2597.
93. Justice Stewart's vote was crucial for the judgment because the Chief Justice's opinion
was joined only by Justices White and Rehnquist. Justices Stevens, Brennan and Powell
dissented. Justices Marshall and Blackmun did not participate.
94. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2588, 2598 (1978)(Justice Stewart concurring in the
judgment).
95. "Petitioner's no-access policy, modified only in the wake of respondents' resort to the
courts, could survive constitutional scrutiny only if the Constitution affords no protection to
the public's right to be informed about conditions within those public ins-titutions where some
of its members are confined ... " Id. at 2605 (Justice Stevens dissenting).
96. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Justice Powell
dissenting); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
97. In fact, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to a privilege cae which is scheduled
for oral arguments in early November or late October. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 922 (1978), involves a defamation suit against CBS for a
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But, it has become apparent that the Supreme Court is unwilling to
interpret the press clause of the first amendment as providing constitu-
tional privileges not already mandated by the speech clause. In neither
Zurcher nor Houchins did the Court recognize first amendment infringe-
ments, and it is only arguable that it did recognize any burden on freedom
of the press in Branzburg. Whether these decisions have had or will have
a substantial "chilling effect" on dissemination of the news is impossible
to tell. But the Court has shown its willingness to risk that chilling effect
by refusing to recognize consitutional safeguards protecting confidentiality
of reporters' sources and files, and access to news events, both of which
help make up the lifeblood of good reporting.
John D. Epps
documentary shown on the program "60 Minutes." The plaintiff is asking that the reporters
involved be made to answer certain questions in depositions regarding their conclusions and
judgments during the editorial, pre-broadcast process. Although extraordinarily helpful
throughout the discovery process, the defendants balked at these questions. The Circuit
Court ruled in favor of the reporters. Although no confidential sources or information is
involved, the defendants are claiming and the Circuit Court agreed, that forcing this discov-
ery would not only chill the dissemination of news, but the very thought process involved in
producing the news.
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